Wednesday, October 8, 2014

The Equine Immunity Statute

The Ninth District Court of Appeals recently reviewed a case where it compared the Equine Immunity Statute (R.C. 2305.321) with the statutory cause of action for injuries sustained as a result of another person’s dog (R.C. 955.28).  In Graham v. Shamrock Stables (9th Dist.), 2014-Ohio-3977, Graham was at Shamrock Stables looking at a horse to adopt.  A dog harbored on Shamrock Stables’ property allegedly barked and jumped at the horse’s back legs.  The horse in question became spooked, swung around and knocked Graham to the ground.  As a result of the fall, Graham seriously injured two of her fingers.

Graham argued that the Equine Immunity Statute did not apply because her injuries were the proximate result of the dog; therefore, the injuries are compensable under R.C. 955.28.  The Court disagreed.

To prove a statutory cause of action pursuant to R.C. 955.28, the plaintiff must prove ownership or keepership of the dog, that the dog’s actions were the proximate cause of the injury, and damages.  However, the Equine Immunity Statute provides immunity from liability for harm sustained by an equine activity participant allegedly from the inherent risk of equine activity. 

Graham was an equine activity participant.  The “inherent risks” include the unpredictability of an equine’s action to other animals.  Graham concede that immunity would exits if she were bringing suit against Shamrock Stables as a sponsor or an equine activity.  Graham stated there was no immunity because her suit arose from the injuries she received as a proximate result of the dog, not that the horse reacted to the dog. 

The Court looked at the plain language of the Equine Liability Statute.  Since the General Assembly did not exempt an equine’s reaction to dogs, the horse’s reaction to the dog would qualify as an inherent risk of equine activity.  Therefore, Shamrock Stables was entitled to immunity.


Judge Carr dissented, stating that the general immunity provision in the Equine Immunity Statute must yield to the exception created by the special provision in R.C. 955.28 for injuries occasioned by dogs.  

John Izzo, Esq.

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